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This paper examines a multi-agent moral hazard model in which agents have expectation-based
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the agent is loss averse and the project is hard to achieve, the optimal contract is based on team incentives
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a new insight: team incentives serve as a loss-sharing device among agents. This model can explain the
empirical puzzle of why ﬁrms often pay a bonus to low-performance employees as well as high-performance
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1 Introduction
Teams have been widespread in many ﬁrms. As teams have become popular, the role of team incentives has
been increasingly crucial in workplaces.1 Why team incentives have so prevailed is one of the main themes
in organizational economics, and a central issue is whether an incentive scheme should be based on indepen-
dent performance evaluation (IPE), relative performance evaluation (RPE) or joint performance evaluation
(JPE).2 While most existing literature has studied team incentives from the view of competition, cooperation
or mutual monitoring, we focus on a prominent behavioral aspect, loss aversion: people evaluate losses more
than same-sized gains. We show that when the agents feel a psychological gain-loss from comparing the
realized outcome with the reference outcomes, team incentives could serve as a device which alleviates their
feeling of losses.3 In contrast to the previous literature, team incentives in this paper become relevant only
when the agent fail to succeed his own project. The result can explain some empirical evidence that ﬁrms
pay a bonus not only to high-performance agents but also to low-performance ones. For example, Google
gave $1000 cash holiday bonus to all employees in 2010.4
We build a multi-agent moral hazard model with limited liability in which agents have expectation-based
reference-dependent preferences a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We derive which of the above three
types of performance evaluation is optimal as a function of the degree of loss aversion and the probability of
success in the project. A principal wants to minimize the expected payments to the agents given that each of
them works hard in his own project.5 The agent’s utility depends not only on his realized outcome but also
on the comparisons between his realized outcome and his reference outcomes. That is, each agent’s utility
consists of an intrinsic “consumption utility” which is same as the standard one, and a “gain-loss utility”
which is deﬁned over the diﬀerences between his realized consumption and his reference consumption. The
agent is loss-averse in both the wage dimension and the eﬀort dimension, and his reference point is determined
1Lazear and Shaw (2007) introduce the evidence of popularity of teams and team incentives. For example, from 1987 to
1996, the share of large ﬁrms that have 20% or more employees in teams rose from 37% to 61% and that have more than 20%
of employees working with some kind of group-based incentives rose from 26% to 53%. Che and Yoo (2001) also provide much
evidence of successful adaptation of teams in workplaces.
2IPE, RPE or JPE means that a worker’s wage is irrelevant to, decreases in, or increases in the other workers’ performance,
respectively.
3We use the term “team incentives” to refer to incentives by a wage scheme based on either JPE or RPE.
4See Blodget (2010) which is an article in Business Insider. Also, Lufthansa paid 700-euro ($930) bonus to all employees in
January 2011 (Lavell 2010). As a unique (non-monetary bonus) example, IKEA gave a bicycle as a bonus to all U.S. employees
in 2010 (Angelico 2010).
5We use male pronouns to refer to the agent and female pronouns to refer to the principal.
2
by his recent expectations regarding his wage and eﬀort.6 Due to loss aversion, the agent dislikes wage
uncertainty in a way that is diﬀerent from usual concave utilities. Consider an example that an agent
had expected to receive either $0 or $30 with equal probabilities when he would work hard with cost $10.
Suppose that he actually works hard. Regarding the wage dimension, his expected gain-loss utility consists
of a weighted average of the following four cases with equal weights on each case. In two cases, there is
no gain-loss: he expects $0 and actually gets $0, and he expects $30 and actually gets $30. However, if he
expects $30 but actually gets $0, he feels a loss of $30. Similarly, if he expects $0 but actually gets $30,
he feels a gain of $30. Since the agent is loss-averse, his feeling of $30 loss is greater than that of $30 gain.
Thus, his expected gain-loss utility for wage is negative and represents his averseness of risk in this example.
Regarding the eﬀort dimension, he feels no gain or loss because he expected to work hard and actually works
hard.
To determine the agent’s reference points endogenously, we assume that each agent’s reference points
are updated to his chosen action before the outcome is realized. Since he knows that his belief will be
adapted to his chosen action, he takes it into account when he chooses the action. This notion is called
the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) and advocated by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007).7 CPE is
plausible when the action is determined long before the outcome realizes, and his belief is acclimated before
he knows the actual outcome.
In adopting the concept of CPE, we consider a symmetric two-agent case with limited liability and derive
the optimal wage scheme. The crux is that the principal faces a trade-oﬀ between the standard incentives
eﬀect in the intrinsic utility and the loss-sharing eﬀect in the gain-loss utility. The loss-sharing eﬀect means
that the agent can share his expected loss with his colleagues by being compensated for his failure. Regarding
the intrinsic utility, the agent is less willing to work under team incentives with compensation than under
IPE because his incentive to work hard decreases if the principal compensates for his failure.8 In contrast,
with respect to the gain-loss utility, he is more willing to work under team incentives than under IPE. This is
because team incentives with partial compensation for the agent’s failure reduce his wage uncertainty when
6As we will explain below, in our multi-agent setting, the agent’s wage depends on his colleagues’ actions and outcomes as
well as on his own actions and outcomes. Shalev (2000) investigates game theoretic models in which the players are loss averse.
7Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop another equilibrium concept, the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE). In Appendix
B, we explain the notion of PPE and fully characterize the optimal contracts in our two-agent model based on this concept.
When the degree of loss aversion is large, the properties of equilibrium wage schemes under PPE are similar to under CPE. We
also discuss these points in Appendix B.
8With respect to JPE, this negative eﬀect is usually called as a free-riding eﬀect. See, for example, Holmstrom (1982).
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he works, and increase it when he shirks. In other words, the loss-averse agent can share his fear of losses
from failure with his colleagues by partially compensating for his failure via team incentives. As a result,
the trade-oﬀ between the standard incentive eﬀect and the loss-sharing eﬀect determines the optimal wage
schemes.
We analyze how and when team incentives are used in the optimal contract. When the degree of loss
aversion is moderate and the possibility of success in the task is small even if the agent works hard, JPE
becomes optimal. As the possibility of success becomes small, the agent is less likely to work hard under IPE
because his wage uncertainty under working compared to under shirking becomes large. Then the principal’s
incentive to compensate for his failure increases, and JPE as a partial compensation for his failure becomes
the optimal wage scheme. When the degree of loss aversion is large, there are three cases in which team
incentives are optimal. If the agent is less likely to succeed when he shirks, not only JPE but also RPE
may be optimal. In particular, RPE is optimal when the agent is more likely to succeed if he works. The
standard incentives eﬀect of discouraging to work under RPE is smaller than that under JPE, and this eﬀect
determines the optimal wage scheme. In contrast, JPE is optimal when the agent is less likely to succeed
even if he works. However, when the agent is very unlikely to succeed even if he works, the principal has
strong incentives to compensate for his failure. Since the probability of compensating for the agents’ failure
is larger under RPE than under JPE in this situation, RPE instead of JPE may become optimal.
In addition, we extend our two-agent model to many agents case. As in the two-agent case, the trade-oﬀ
between the standard incentive eﬀect and the loss-sharing eﬀect drives the results. Hence, compensating for
the agent’s failure is beneﬁcial for the principal when the latter eﬀect overweighs the former one. However,
as the probability of the compensation goes to one, the standard incentive eﬀect dominates the loss-sharing
eﬀect. Thus, the principal compensates for the agent’s failure only partially. The optimal contract speciﬁes
that the principal pays the bonus either when the agent succeeds in his task or when the total proﬁt (derived
from other agents’ performance) is higher than a certain level. It is consistent with the above empirical
evidence that ﬁrms often pay a bonus to all employees when they earn a high proﬁt. Also, this result is
sharply diﬀerent from that of Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010); in their model the principal wants to
compensate for the agent’s failure as much as possible.9
9In their model, the expected wage payment to the agent is decreasing in the probability that the principal compensates for
the agent’s failure if the degree of loss-aversion is more than two, because the amount of base wage goes to negative inﬁnity as
the probability goes to one. We discuss it in detail in section 4.
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Notice that, if the principal can commit to stochastically compensate for the agent’s failure regardless
of other agents’ outcomes, our results do not need to be team incentives. However, JPE as team incentives
is more plausible than the individual stochastic compensation in practical situations. For example, if the
principal has the possibility of facing a budget constraint, then she cannot pay a bonus when all of the agents
fail under the individual stochastic compensation but she can pay it under JPE. Also, if the principal is risk
or loss averse, then she prefers JPE to the individual stochastic compensation because the distribution of
proﬁts is less dispersed under JPE than under the individual stochastic compensation. In addition, it may be
hard to ﬁnd veriﬁable stochastic signal other than the company’s proﬁt or other agents’ outcomes, and this
diﬃculty may prevent using the individual stochastic compensation.10 These advantages of team incentives
over the individual stochastic compensation separate our results from the stochastic ignorance examined by
Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010).
Last but not least, our model does not shed light on the aspects which constitute team production:
our model has no common noise, no externalities on production and no activities among agents such as
help, sabotage and mutual monitoring. In this sense, our model diﬀers from the existing literature on team
incentives. However, we show even if we do not explicitly incorporate such aspects of team production,
making teams and introducing team incentives may be beneﬁcial for managers. It helps to understand why
teams and team incentives are ubiquitous even when some workplaces do not seem to have above aspects of
team production. Moreover, our results of team incentives as compensating for the agent’s failure are easy
to test empirically, because we only need to check when low-performance agents get a bonus. This feature
of our results may contribute to investigate one empirical puzzle pointed by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2003):
ﬁrms seem to use JPE for executive compensations very often.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We set up the model and explain the CPE condition
in the next section. In Section 3, we analyze the optimal wage schemes in the two-agent case. In Section
4, we extend our model to the case with many agents. We summarize the related literature in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs and the analysis under PPE are provided in Appendix.
10In this argument, we assume that the agents’ total outcome is perfectly correlated with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. If the proﬁt is a
noisy signal of the agents’ outcomes, the principal may prefer the individual stochastic compensation to team incentives.
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2 The Model
Consider the following moral hazard model in which a risk-neutral principal hires two identical agents. The
agents are subject to a limited liability and his utility consists of an intrinsic (standard material) utility and
a gain-loss utility. Agent i (i = 1; 2) makes a binary eﬀort decision ai 2 f0; 1g at the cost of d ¢ ai where
d > 0. Actions ai = 0 and ai = 1 mean that agent i shirks and works, respectively. The outcome of agent
i is either high or low, denoted by Qi 2 fH;Lg. The probability for agent i of realizing Qi = H is q1 if
ai = 1 and q0 if ai = 0, where 0 · q0 < q1 < 1. We deﬁne ∆q ´ q1 ¡ q0. The wage vector for agent i is
wi ´ (wiHH ; wiHL; wiLH ; wiLL) where wiQiQj is the wage for agent i when the outcome of agent i is Qi and
that of agent j is Qj (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j).11 Suppose that agents i and j choose actions ai 2 f0; 1g and
aj 2 f0; 1g, respectively. Agent i’s expected wage under wi is represented by
¼i(ai; aj ;wi) = qaiqajw
i
HH + qai(1¡ qaj )wiHL + (1¡ qai)qajwiLH + (1¡ qai)(1¡ qaj )wiLL;
The characteristic of a wage scheme is determined by how each agent’s wage is related to his colleague’s
performance. For agent i, a wage scheme wi exhibits joint performance evaluation (JPE) if (wiHH ; w
i
LH) >
(wiHL; w
i
LL): given an agent’s performance, his wage increases in his colleague’s performance.
12 A wage
scheme exhibits relative performance evaluation (RPE) if (wiHH ; w
i
LH) < (w
i
HL; w
i
LL): given an agent’s
performance, his wage decreases in his colleague’s performance. Finally, if (wiHH ; w
i
LH) = (w
i
HL; w
i
LL), a
wage scheme exhibits independent performance evaluation (IPE): an agent’s wage does not depend on his
colleague’s performance.
A key assumption of our model is that each agent’s overall utility consists of an intrinsic utility and a
psychological gain-loss utility. We assume that agents have expectation-based reference-dependent prefer-
ences a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In our model, agent i’s both consumption bundle and reference
consumption bundle consist of his eﬀort and his wage. For each consumption dimension, the agent feels
psychological gain-loss by comparing his realized outcome with his reference outcomes. We assume that all
agents have the same gain-loss function for each consumption dimension. For deterministic reference point
cases, suppose that agent i’s reference point for his eﬀort and his wage are aˆii and wˆ
i, respectively. If he
11 Our multi-agent model can be interpreted as the following multi-task model: a principal has two identical tasks and chooses
either to hire one agent who is assigned both tasks or hire two agents each of whom is assigned one task. We refer to this point
later.
12The inequality means weak inequality for each component and strict inequality for at least one component.
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actually exerts his eﬀort ai and gets wage w, then his utility is
w ¡ aid+ ¹(w ¡ wˆi) + ¹(¡aid+ aˆiid);
where ¹(¢) is a universal gain-loss function that satisﬁes the assumptions introduced by Bowman et al. (1999)
which corresponds to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function. In what follows, we assume ¹(¢) to
be piecewise linear to focus on the eﬀect of loss aversion. Then, we can simply deﬁne the gain-loss function
when the consumption is x and reference point is r as
¹(x¡ r) =
(
´(x¡ r) if x¡ r ¸ 0,
´¸(x¡ r) if x¡ r < 0.
where ´ ¸ 0 represents the weight on the gain-loss payoﬀ, and ¸ ¸ 1 is the degree of the loss aversion.
As in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that the reference point is rational beliefs about
outcomes and that the reference point itself is stochastic if the outcome is stochastic. The agent feels gain-
loss by comparing each possible outcome with every reference point. For example, suppose that agent i with
´ > 0 and ¸ > 1 had been expecting to receive $100, $150 or $200 with equal probabilities. If he actually
receives $150, then he feels a psychological gain of $50 relative to $100, no gain-loss relative to $150 and a
psychological loss of $50 relative to $200. Since the loss of $50 looms larger than the gain of $50 for him,
his gain-loss utility is negative in this case.13 Since we consider a multiple-agent model, an agent’s reference
outcomes and realized outcomes may depend on his colleague’s action. We represent both consumption and
reference bundles of agent i as including his colleague’s action as well as his action and wage. Formally,
agent i’s expected intrinsic utility is
¼i(ai; aj ;wi)¡ aid:
Let (aˆii; aˆ
i
j) be agent i’s reference point for his own eﬀort decision (aˆ
i
i) and his colleague’s one (aˆ
i
j). That is,
(aˆii; aˆ
i
j) represents agent i’s belief that he will choose ai and agent j will choose aj . Similarly, denote wˆ
i as
agent i’s reference wage based on (aˆii; aˆ
i
j). Then, agent i’s expected gain-loss utility is
¼i(ai; aj ;wijaˆii; aˆij ; wˆi) + ¹(¡aid+ aˆiid)
where ¼i(ai; aj ;wijaˆii; aˆij ; wˆi) represents the gain-loss utility in the wage dimension and ¹(¡aid+ aˆiid) repre-
sents that in the eﬀort-cost dimension.14 Let qˆiai (resp. qˆ
i
aj ) denote agent i’s reference point of the probability
13By using (1), below we explain the pointwise comparison in detail. See Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) for a general deﬁnition.
14We write down the detailed representation of ¼i(ai; aj ;w
ijaˆii; aˆij ; wˆi) at the beginning of Appendix A.
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for realizing Qi = H (resp. Qj = H) when his reference eﬀort decision is aˆii (resp. aˆ
i
j). Suppose, for instance,
that agent i expects that both agents succeed with probability qˆiai qˆ
i
aj and his reference wage is wˆ
i
HH . When
agent i succeeds with probability qai and his colleague succeeds (resp. fails) with probability qaj (resp.
1¡ qaj ), he compares his reference wage wˆiHH to his actual wage wiHH (resp. wiHL) with probability qaiqaj
(resp. qai(1¡ qaj )). Conversely, when agent i fails with probability 1¡ qai and his colleague succeeds (resp.
fails) with probability qaj (resp. 1 ¡ qaj ), he compares his reference wage wˆiHH to his actual wage wiLH
(resp. wiLL) with probability (1¡ qai)qaj (resp. (1¡ qai)(1¡ qaj )). Then, the gain-loss utility in the money
dimension of this situation is represented by
qˆiai qˆ
i
aj
h
qaiqaj¹(w
i
HH ¡ wˆiHH) + qai(1¡ qaj )¹(wiHL ¡ wˆiHH)
+ (1¡ qai)qaj¹(wiLH ¡ wˆiHH) + (1¡ qai)(1¡ qaj )¹(wiLL ¡ wˆiHH)
i
: (1)
We derive the optimal wage schemes according to the equilibrium concept deﬁned by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007); the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE).15 Under CPE, the agent’s reference point is
acclimated to his taken action. This is plausible when the action is determined long before the outcome and
the payment occur; hence, he modiﬁes his belief to his taken action before the outcome realizes. Because the
agent knows that his belief will change based on his own action before the outcome and the payment occur,
he takes the change into account when he decides what action to take. Denote agent i’s expected overall
utility be U i(ai; aj ;wijaˆii; aˆij ; wˆi) ´ ¼i(ai; aj ;wi)¡ aid+¼i(ai; aj ;wijaˆii; aˆij ; wˆi)+¹(¡aid+ aˆiid). Since each
agent’s action determines his reference point in CPE, the condition to choose working in CPE is represented
by
U i(1; 1;wij1; 1; wˆi) ¸ U i(0; 1;wij0; 1; wˆi): (CPE)
for all i.16 The condition (CPE) means that, given that agent i expects agent j to choose eﬀort 1, agent i’s
utility when his reference of his own action is 1 and he chooses 1 is higher than that when his reference is 0
and he chooses 0. We conﬁne our analysis to pure strategies and focus on symmetric equilibria.17
15In Appendix B, we analyze the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE): another equilibrium concept introduced by Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007).
16In Appendix A, we rewrite this condition in detail.
17In what follows, we abbreviate agent notations in superscript because the agents are identical.
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3 The Optimal Wage Scheme
3.1 The Optimal Contract without Loss Aversion
Before analyzing the optimal wage scheme in our model, we study a benchmark case in which each agent is
not loss-averse.
Note that, if the high eﬀort is not beneﬁcial for the principal and she does not prefer to encourage the
agents to work, then setting wQiQj = 0 for all Qi; Qj 2 fH;Lg is obviously the optimal wage scheme. Thus,
throughout this paper, we assume the tasks are so valuable that the principal wants to make the agents
work.
The principal’s problem can be rewritten as:
min
wHH ;wHL;wLH ;wLL
q21wHH + q1(1¡ q1)wHL + q1(1¡ q1)wLH + (1¡ q1)2wLL
subject to
q1wHH + (1¡ q1)wHL ¡ q1wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)wLL ¸ d∆q ; (IC)
wQiQj ¸ 0 for all Qi; Qj 2 fH;Lg: (LL)
where (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint to induce the agents to exert high eﬀorts, and (LL) is
the limited liability constraints. Note that the left hand side of (IC) is decreasing in wLH and wLL. Hence
the optimal contract scheme satisﬁes wLH = wLL = 0. Also, the ratio between the coeﬃcient of wHH and
the coeﬃcient of wHL in the objective function is same as that in (IC). Thus, any pairs of wHH (¸ 0) and
wHL (¸ 0) that satisfy (IC) with equality and wLH = wLL = 0 are the optimal wage schemes.
To conﬁrm the robustness of the result, we investigate another case in which the agents are risk averse.
Suppose that the agents have a utility functionm(¢) such thatm(0) = 0,m(¢) is twice diﬀerentiable,m0(¢) > 0
and m00(¢) < 0. Then, (IC) is replaced by
q1m(wHH) + (1¡ q1)m(wHL)¡ q1m(wLH)¡ (1¡ q1)m(wLL) ¸ d∆q : (IC’)
Note that the left hand side of (IC’) is still decreasing in wLH and wLL. Because m(¢) is strictly concave,
wHH = wHL holds at the optimum. As a result, wHH = wHL = m¡1( d∆q ) and wLH = wLL = 0 is the
optimal wage scheme. Note that this scheme exhibits IPE.
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3.2 The Optimal Contract with Loss Aversion
Now, we return to the case in which he agents are loss-averse and examine the optimal wage schemes. As
mentioned by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) and Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), it is suitable to apply
CPE when the outcomes are resolved long after the agents’ actions are taken. In the following analysis, we
assume away the “negative bonus” wage schemes to make the property of team incentives clear and simplify
the analysis.18
Assumption 1. wHH ¸ wLH and wHL ¸ wLL.
By this assumption, the possible smallest wage is either wLH or wLL. Notice that if the smallest wage is
strictly positive, then the principal can reduce the payment without changing CPE constraint by decreasing
the same amount from each wage.19 Also, since agents dislike wage uncertainty, if wHH 6= wHL then the
principal can encourage the agent to work by reducing the wage variation when he succeeds. Thus, we have
the following characteristics of the optimal wage scheme.20
Lemma 1. The optimal wage schemes under CPE satisfy (i) minfwLH ; wLLg = 0 and (ii) wHH = wHL.
Lemma 1 implies that team incentives in our model would have diﬀerent forms from those in the existing
literature, like Che and Yoo (2001) and Kvaløy and Olsen (2006), which show the optimality of team
incentives. These studies ﬁnd that, when the agent fails, his wage is zero regardless of his colleague’s
outcome while it may depend on their outcomes when he succeeds.21 In contrast, our results mean that
team incentives become relevant only when the agent fails the project. Whether the principal compensates
the agent’s failure or not depends on another agent’s outcome. As a result, the wage schemes may have
forms of team incentives. In what follows, we denote wHH = wHL ´ w.
Notice that Lemma 1 represents an empirically testable prediction in our model: if the agents’ loss
aversion matters, the optimal team incentives exhibit the forms of compensation but do not exhibit the
concentration of the payments like wHH > 0 and wHL = wLH = wLL = 0, which is often predicted in the
18We also characterize the optimal wage scheme under CPE in which we allow such negative bonuses. The optimal contract
in this case is the same as long as ´(¸ ¡ 1) · 1. If it does not hold, then the negative bonuses are used if the probability of
success when the agent shirks is small, and the probability of success when the agent works is either very large or very small.
The detailed analysis is available upon request.
19See (CPE’) in Appendix A.
20The proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
21For example, Che and Yoo (2001) and Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) predict no compensation for the agents’ failure (wLH =
wLL = 0) in their models.
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previous literature.
By Lemma 1, we have two possible types of wage schemes: (i) w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0 and (ii) w ¸ wLL ¸
wLH = 0. We ﬁnd the optimal wage scheme in each case. Then, we compare these schemes and characterize
the optimal wage scheme as CPE.
First, we examine case (i) w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0. The principal’s problem becomes as follows:
min
w;wLH
q1w + q1(1¡ q1)wLH
subject to
f1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)gw + [¡1 + f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 + (1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)]q1wLH ¸ d∆q ; (CPEJ)
w ¸ 0; and wLH 2 [0; w]: (LLJ)
where (CPEJ) is the condition of CPE and (LLJ) is the limited liability condition in this case, respectively.
Now we focus on the left hand side of (CPEJ):
f1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)gw
+f¡q1|{z}
(SI)
+ q1(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)| {z }
(LS1)
+ q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)| {z }
(LS2)
gwLH :
There are three eﬀects for increasing wLH . We call the ﬁrst eﬀect (SI) as the standard incentive eﬀect, and a
sum of the latter two eﬀects (LS1) and (LS2) as the loss-sharing eﬀect. (SI) is came from the intrinsic utility
and implies that increasing wLH reduces the incentive to work hard. (LS1) is came from the gain-loss utility
comparing wLH with w. It means increasing wLH encourages the agent to work hard because it reduces
wage uncertainty when working, provided q1 + q0 < 1. (LS2) is came from the gain-loss utility comparing
wLH with wLL. It implies increasing wLH encourages the agent to work hard it adds wage uncertainty when
shirking. Notice that (SI) does not depend on ´, ¸, while the eﬀects on (LS1) and (LS2) increases as ´ or ¸
increases. The cut-oﬀ point at which loss-sharing eﬀect becomes crucial than the standard incentive eﬀect is
given by ΩJ ´ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 + q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1). That is, the principal prefers wLH > 0 rather
than wLH = 0 if and only if ΩJ ¸ 1.
The analysis and the trade-oﬀ between the standard incentive eﬀect and loss-sharing eﬀect are similar
in the case of (ii) w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0. The principal prefers wLL > 0 rather than wLL = 0 if and only if
ΩR ´ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 + q21(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1) ¸ 1.
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Finally, we compare above two cases to derive the optimal wage schemes. If both ΩJ < 1 and ΩR < 1
hold, then IPE is optimal. Otherwise, team incentives are optimal and whether JPE or RPE to be optimal
is determined by the relationship among ΩJ , ΩR, and the cut-oﬀ point ΩJR ´ f(1¡q1¡q0)¡q1(1¡q1)2(2¡
q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸ ¡ 1) derived by comparing between the expected payment under JPE and that under RPE.
On the one hand, when ΩJ ¸ ΩR, JPE is optimal if ΩJR · 1, otherwise RPE is optimal. On the other
hand, when ΩJ < ΩR, JPE is optimal if ΩJR ¸ 1, otherwise RPE is optimal. As a result, we have a full
characterization of optimal wage schemes as in the following proposition.22
Proposition 1. The optimal wage scheme under CPE is:
1. wI = (wI ; wI ; 0; 0) where wI = d∆q [1¡(1¡q1¡q0)´(¸¡1)] if both ΩJ < 1 and ΩR < 1 hold.
2. wJ = (wJ ; wJ ; wJ ; 0) where wJ ´ d∆q(1¡q1)[1¡f1¡q1¡q0¡q1(2¡q1¡q0)g´(¸¡1)] if one of the following con-
ditions holds; (i) q1 · 12 and ΩR < 1 · ΩJ , (ii) q1 · 12 and ΩJR · 1 · ΩR · ΩJ , and (iii) q1 > 12 and
1 · ΩJR < ΩJ < ΩR.
3. wR = (wR; wR; 0; wR) where wR = d∆qq1[1¡f1¡q1¡q0¡(1¡q1)(2¡q1¡q0)g´(¸¡1)] if one of the following
conditions holds; (i) q1 · 12 and 1 < ΩJR < ΩR · ΩJ , (ii) q1 > 12 and ΩJ < 1 · ΩR, and (iii) q1 > 12
and ΩJR < 1 · ΩJ < ΩR.
As we described above, the optimal wage schemes depend on the trade-oﬀ between the standard incentive
eﬀect and the loss-sharing eﬀect. Regarding the intrinsic utility, the agent is less willing to work under team
incentives than under IPE because he gets a wage with positive probability even when he fails. However,
regarding the gain-loss utility, he is more willing to work under team incentives than under IPE because it
reduces his wage uncertainty.
Proposition 1 provides the following insights about team incentives. First, team incentives become
optimal only when q0 < 0:648. When q0 is large, the agent is very likely to succeed his project even if
he shirks. In other words, his expected loss becomes small even if he shirks. Then, compensating for his
failure is not optimal for the principal because the standard incentive eﬀect becomes more salient than the
loss-sharing eﬀect in this case. Consequently, team incentives are not optimal when q0 is large. Second, when
22The proof is provided in Appendix A.2.
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the degree of loss aversion is moderate, i.e. ´(¸¡1) · 1, only JPE appears as the optimal team incentives.23
Third, when the degree of loss aversion becomes larger than the above value, by and large JPE becomes
optimal when q1 · 12 and RPE becomes optimal when q1 > 12 .
We explain the above results in detail by providing two ﬁgures with numerical examples of ´ and ¸.
Figure 1 represents the optimal contracts when the degree of loss aversion is moderate such that ´ = 1 and
¸ = 2. As q1 decreases, the agents’ wage uncertainty under working compared to under shirking becomes
large, and the agents are less likely to work hard under IPE. Then the principal’s incentive to compensate
the agents’ failure increases. As a result, JPE becomes optimal if q1 is small.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
q1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q0
Figure 1: CPE when ´ = 1, ¸ = 2. The region of each contract scheme which is optimal in CPE is shown
by: IPE=White, JPE=Gray.
When ´(¸ ¡ 1) becomes large, not only JPE but also RPE may be optimal. Figure 2 represents the
optimal contracts when the degree of loss aversion is large such that ´ = 1 and ¸ = 3. Considering the case
(ii) w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0, we can represent the CPE condition by
f1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)gw
+f¡(1¡ q1)| {z }
(SI’)
+ (1¡ q1)(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)| {z }
(LS1’)
+ q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)| {z }
(LS2)
gwLL ¸ d∆q : (CPER)
23Some theoretical literature which analyzes reference-dependent preferences imposes ´(¸ ¡ 1) · 1 as an assumption. See,
for example, Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), Eisenhuth (2010) or Herweg and Mierendorﬀ (2011).
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First, suppose that q1 is not too small. Notice that the absolute value of (SI’) is smaller than (SI) if and
only if q1 > 12 . In words, the eﬀect of discouraging to work hard under RPE is smaller than under JPE if the
agent is more likely to succeed when he works. In addition, the coeﬃcient (LS1) or (LS1’) becomes smaller
or even negative when q1 is large. Hence the comparison of the standard incentive eﬀects between (SI) under
JPE and (SI’) under RPE becomes crucial when we determine whether JPE or RPE is the optimal wage
scheme in that case. As a result, in Figure 2 we get the optimality of RPE when q1 > 12 and that of JPE
when q1 · 12 , provided q1 is not too small and q0 is not too large.
However, as q1 decreases, the principal needs to compensate much more in order to make the agents work
hard. Notice that the probability of paying wLH is lower than that of paying wLL if and only if q1 · 12 .24
When q1 is very small, the probability of paying wLH becomes low, and (CPEJ) is hard to satisfy because
both (LS1) and (LS2) become small. In that case RPE is more attractive than JPE because (LS1’) becomes
large as q1 decreases. Thus, the principal chooses RPE instead of JPE as the optimal contract when q1 is
quite small in order to alleviate the agents’ loss aversion. In Figure 2, this corresponds to the region where
RPE is optimal in the region of q1 · 12 .
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
q1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q0
Figure 2: CPE when ´ = 1, ¸ = 3. The region of each contract scheme which is optimal in CPE is shown
by: IPE=White, JPE=Gray, RPE=Light Gray.
It is worth clarifying that if the principal can commit an individual stochastic compensation regardless of
24The probability of paying wLH is q1(1¡ q1) and that of wLL is (1¡ q1)2.
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other agents’ outcomes when the agent fails, our results do not need to be team incentives. As described in
Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), if the principal can use the lottery which is observable and veriﬁable
for the compensation, commit to ignore the bad outcome and pay the bonus unconditionally with a positive
probability, the contract with such individual stochastic compensation is optimal. However, there are some
conceptual and practical advantages of team incentives. First, it is diﬃcult for the principal to commit
the individual stochastic compensation. If the lottery by which the principal implements the individual
stochastic compensation is not observable or not veriﬁable, then the commitment is not credible. Thus, not
only is such compensation unobserved in practice, but also it is not clear how the principal can commit and
convince each agent of it.25 In contrast, we focus on the multi-agent model. Since each agent’s performance
is observable and veriﬁable, the principal can credibly compensate for the agent’s failure according to other
agents’ performance by adopting team incentives. Next, if we take managerial aspects into account, JPE
as team incentives becomes strictly better than the individual stochastic compensation. For example, if
the principal has a possibility to face a budget constraint, she cannot pay a bonus when all of the agents
fail under the individual stochastic compensation. In contrast, if the principal adopts JPE, she can pay
a bonus only if some agents succeed their projects. Thus, provided the tasks are highly valuable, she can
implement the wage scheme with a stochastic compensation for the agents’ failure by using JPE even when it
is impossible to do so by using the individual stochastic compensation. Moreover, if the principal is risk/loss
averse then she prefers JPE to the individual stochastic compensation. This is because the distribution
of proﬁts is less dispersed under JPE than under the individual stochastic compensation. These aspects
diﬀerentiate team incentives in our model from the individual stochastic compensation in Herweg, Mu¨ller
and Weinschenk (2010).26 Our results may provide an explanation of the eﬀectiveness of adopting teams
and recent popularity of teams in many ﬁrms.
Interestingly, in addition to the above advantage to use JPE rather than individual stochastic compensa-
tion, JPE may become the optimal wage scheme even if ´(¸¡ 1) · 1.27 This result implies that, even when
the agent does not have large loss-aversion sensitivities and hence the principal can induce their eﬀorts under
25Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) also refer to the plausibility of the individual stochastic compensation that
“[r]estricting the principal to oﬀer nonstochastic wage payments is standard in the principal-agent literature and also in accor-
dance with observed practice.”
26For other important diﬀerences between our results and Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), see Section 4.
27The condition ´(¸ ¡ 1) · 1 corresponds with “no dominance of gain-loss utility” assumption in Herweg, Mu¨ller and
Weinschenk (2010). In their Proposition 7, they show that if the assumption is satisﬁed, then the stochastic compensation is
not optimal. We discuss the details of the diﬀerence in Section 4.
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IPE, JPE may be still better than IPE. This is because we address the impact of CPE constraint on the
optimal wage schemes, and the agents prefer JPE to IPE due to its role of partially compensating for their
failure. Thus, in the optimal contract they get a same bonus even when one agent achieves high performance
and the other one achieves low performance. This result is consistent with ﬁrms’ bonus payment schemes
mentioned in Section 1, and empirical literature which reports the validness of JPE reviewed in Section 5.
To analyze it more clearly, in the next section we investigate the many-agent case.
4 The Optimal Wage Scheme with Many Agents
In this section, we characterize the optimal wage schemes when the principal hires many agents. Let N + 1
be the number of agents. Consider the case in which each agent’s wage depends not only on his outcome
but also on the number of other agents whose outcomes are high. Let n (· N) denote this number. The
agent’s wage can be written as w(Qi; n) ¸ 0, where Qi 2 fH;Lg and n 2 f0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng. Here, we make the
following assumptions.
Assumption 2. (i) 8n w(H;n) ¸ w(L; n).
(ii) 8Qi 8n 8n0 ¸ n w(Qi; n0) ¸ w(Qi; n).
(iii) (1¡ q1)N · 12 .
As in Section 3, we assume away the “negative bonus” wage schemes in the ﬁrst assumption. The second
assumption implies that the agent’s wage weakly increases as the total outcome of his colleagues increases.
That is, we focus on the cases in which the principal can choose either IPE or JPE.28 The third assumption
is a suﬃcient condition that the high eﬀort is implementable. It obviously holds for any q1 when N is
suﬃciently large.
The following lemma means that the principal can induce each agent to exert high eﬀort, the agent gets
a bonus whenever he succeeds his task, and the principal oﬀers a binary payment scheme in generic as the
optimal contract.29
Lemma 2. (i) High eﬀort (Qi = H) is implementable.
28As shown in the previous section, JPE seems to be kept as the optimal wage schemes even if the degree of loss aversion
is small. In addition, recent surveys on empirical research of team incentives like Chiappori and Salanie´ (2003) and Lazear
and Oyer (forthcoming) mention that ﬁrms often use JPE for executive compensations. Thus, we here focus on JPE as team
incentives and compare it with IPE.
29The proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
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(ii) 8n; n0 2 f0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng w(H;n) = w(H;n0) ´ w > 0.
(iii) In generic, 8n 2 f0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng w(L; n) 2 fw; 0g where w > 0, and the optimal payment scheme is
unique.
As in Lemma 1, the agent dislikes the wage uncertainty. Hence the principal can encourage him to work
by paying a ﬁxed bonus for sure when his outcome is high (Lemma 2 (ii)). Also, as described in Herweg,
Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), the principal’s payment minimization problem becomes a linear programming
problem because we assume linear consumption utilities and piece-wise linear gain-loss utilities. Hence in
generic it has a unique solution at an extreme point of the constraint set (Lemma 2 (iii)).
By Lemma 2, the agent with low outcome can get a bonus if and only if the number of other agents
whose outcomes are high is equal or more than some critical number n¤.30 Let ® be the probability that n
is equal or greater than this critical number: ® ´ Prob(n ¸ n¤). Then, we can interpret that the principal
compensates the agent’s failure with this probability.
Now, the principal’s problem can be reduced to choose the bonus wage w and the compensation probabil-
ity ® so as to minimize her expected payment. In what follows, we ignore the integer problem: the principal
hires suﬃciently many agents so that she can (approximately) choose any level of the compensation proba-
bility ® 2 [0; 1]. In this setting, ® = 0 means IPE: the agent’s wage depends only on his outcome. On the
other hand, ® = 1 means full compensation: the agent gets the bonus for sure even if he fails. In two-agent
case with wHH = wHL = wLH > 0 and wLL = 0, ® is equal to q1.
Then, the principal’s problem becomes:
min
w>0;®2[0;1]
fq1 + ®(1¡ q1)gw
s:t: (1¡ ®)| {z }
(SIM)
w + (1¡ ®)f1¡ (1¡ ®)(2¡ q0 ¡ q1)g´(¸¡ 1)| {z }
(LSM)
w ¸ d
∆q
: (CPEM)
Notice that if ® < 3¡2q1¡2q04¡2q1¡2q0 , then (LSM) is increasing in ®. In this region, (CPEM) exhibits a clear trade-oﬀ
between the standard incentive eﬀect (SIM) and the loss-sharing eﬀect (LSM) in the many-agent case. Also,
® = 1 (full compensation) is never optimal because it does not satisfy (CPEM). As a result, we characterize
the optimal compensation probability as follows:31
30We denote n¤ = N + 1 if w(L;N) = 0.
31The proof is provided in Appendix A.4.
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Proposition 2. The optimal compensation rate ®¤ that comprises the optimal wage scheme is as follows:
®¤ =
8<:0 if
1
´(¸¡1) ¸ (2¡ q0 ¡ q1)(1 + q1)¡ 1;
1
1¡q1
³q
1¡ f1 + 1´(¸¡1)g ¢ 1¡q12¡q0¡q1 ¡ q1
´
if 1´(¸¡1) < (2¡ q0 ¡ q1)(1 + q1)¡ 1:
Proposition 2 means that the principal pays a ﬁxed bonus either when the agent succeeds his task or when
most of other agents succeed.32 It is consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned in Section 1 that
ﬁrms sometime pay a bonus not only to high-outcome employees but also low-outcome ones when the ﬁrms
earn a high proﬁt. The optimal compensation probability is increasing in ´(¸¡ 1). That is, the principal is
more likely to adopt team incentives with partial compensation as the agents’ loss aversion becomes more
signiﬁcant. Also, similar to Proposition 1, team incentives (®¤ > 0) are optimal only when q0 < 0:708. This
is because the standard incentive eﬀect becomes larger than the loss-sharing eﬀect in that region.
Proposition 2 exhibits a sharp diﬀerence from Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010)’s “turning a blind
eye”: when ´(¸ ¡ 1) > 1 the principal wants to compensate for the agent’s failure as much as possible
under the optimal contract. This is because they impose the individual rationality constraint (IR) and the
eﬀect of reducing the agent’s expected loss by increasing the compensation probability as holding IR with
equality totally dominates the our main trade-oﬀ in (CPEM). Though the logic itself is clear, they have
two unattractive results. First, the optimal compensation probability in their model is not well-deﬁned.
Second, and more importantly, a base wage goes to negative inﬁnity and a bonus wage goes to inﬁnity as the
compensation rate goes to one in their result. In contrast to Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), we pay
attention to CPE constraint (or equivalently the incentive compatibility constraint) by imposing the limited
liability constraints. Then, we shed light on the trade-oﬀ between the standard incentive eﬀect and the
loss-sharing eﬀect.33 By this trade-oﬀ, the principal may use team incentives with partially compensating
for the agents’ failure even if IR does not bind. This is because the partial compensation for their failure
provides the loss-averse agents with the incentives to work, while such compensation makes the agents more
likely to shirk if they are loss-neutral. Consequently, the features of our results are driven via the trade-oﬀ
between the standard incentive eﬀect and the loss-sharing eﬀect.
32Precisely, a low-outcome agent can get the bonus if the ratio of high-outcome agents is more than or equal to 1 ¡ ®¤.
33Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) mention that if the agent is subjected to limited liability, the optimal compensation
rate is well deﬁned.
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5 Related Literature
We summarize the literature on the multi-agent moral hazard and on the expectation-based reference-
dependent preferences, which are most related to this paper. We also refer to the literature on team incentives
which incorporates the agents’ social preferences.
First of all, much literature has studied moral hazard problems with multi-agent in this three decades.
It is straightforward to show that incentives based on IPE are optimal in the simple moral hazard model
with risk-averse multi-agent and no common shock.34 Holmstrom (1982), one of the seminal papers in this
ﬁeld, shows that RPE can be optimal if the performance measure includes a common noise factor because
RPE reduces agents’ risk exposure. Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983) also study a
tournament scheme, which is an extreme incentive scheme based on RPE, and demonstrate its potential
eﬃciency. Although these studies illustrate the positive aspects, RPE has certain disadvantages. In addition
to collusion problems, it discourages cooperation among agents and gives incentives to sabotage. JPE can
alleviate these negative eﬀects of teams. These points are supported by empirical studies that team incentives
based on JPE are frequently associated with increased productivity.35 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and
Itoh (1993) show that if agents coordinate their eﬀorts and share risk in a Pareto-eﬃcient way, then JPE
may be an optimal wage scheme. Itoh (1991) shows that if an agent can help other agents and the help is
desirable for a principal, the optimal contract should be based on JPE. Lazear (1989) demonstrates that
JPE can be eﬀective when the issue of sabotage is relevant. Whereas these models are static, Che and Yoo
(2001) and Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) analyze the repeated interactions among agents, and show that JPE
may be preferable to RPE even if it does not hold in the static settings.36
Next, a notion of reference-dependence is originally investigated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Models of the expectation-based reference-dependent preferences are developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006,
2007), and they are applied to understand many economic phenomena. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) analyze
price competition among ﬁrms with loss-averse consumers, and show that ﬁrms oﬀer a sticky (deterministic)
34We brieﬂy study the optimal contracts where the agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse but not loss-averse as the benchmark
case in section 4.1.
35See, for example, Jones and Kato (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003),
and Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007).
36As we brieﬂy mentioned in footnote 11, this paper also relates to the multi-task literature like Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991). In fact, we could see our multi-agent model as a multi-task model in particular situation: a principal has two identical
tasks and chooses either to hire one agent and assign two task to him or hire two agents and assign one task to each of them.
Our results imply that when the agents loss aversion matter, the principal may want to hire one agent and assign two task to
alleviate his expected loss even though it is not optimal in the classical case.
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price in equilibrium even if their cost functions are stochastic and asymmetric. Lange and Ratan (2010)
and Eisenhuth (2010) investigate auctions with loss-averse players. Herweg and Mierendorﬀ (2011) analyzes
a nonlinear pricing when consumers are loss-averse and uncertain about their own demand, and shows
the optimality of ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. Hahn, Kim, Kim, and Lee (2010) investigates a screening problem when
consumers are loss-averse and uncertain about their own valuation.37
As literature related to moral hazard problem where the agent has the expectation-based reference-
dependent preferences, Daido and Itoh (2010) build a simple model with limited liability and study the
Pygmalion and the Galatea eﬀects as self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Gill and Stone (2010) analyze a rank-order
tournament with the agents’ loss aversion.38 Macera (2010) extends Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)’s dynamic loss
aversion model to a repeated moral hazard situation and studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives.
Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), which is most closely related to our study, analyze a single-agent
moral hazard model when the agent is loss averse. They ﬁnd that the optimal contract is a binary bonus
scheme even for a rich performance measure. Also, they show that even if implementation problems arise in
usual payment schemes as originally described by Daido and Itoh (2010), the principal can induce the agent
to exert the desired action by using the stochastic ignorance. Though their logic of the stochastic ignorance
is similar to our logic of compensating for the agents’ failure, there are some sharp diﬀerences. First of all,
Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) focus on a single agent case and do not mention how the principal
can commit the stochastic ignorance. Second, if we care not only on the agents’ loss aversion but also on the
managerial aspects such as the principal’s budget constraint or risk/loss aversion, team incentives may be
strictly better than the stochastic ignorance for the principal as we mentioned in Section 1. Third, our focus
is on the CPE constraint (or equivalently the incentive compatibility constraint) and to analyze the trade-oﬀ
between the standard incentive eﬀect and the loss-sharing eﬀect, whereas the trade-oﬀ on the CPE constraint
is not investigated in Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) because an individual rationality constraint
has a deterministic role in their model. It clearly contrasts our result with their stochastic ignorance result
in Section 4.39
37For contract literature which incorporates reference-dependent preferences but the reference point is not determined by the
expectation, see Carmichael and MacLeod (2003, 2006), de Meza and Webb (2007), Hart (2007), Hart and Moore (2008) and
Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2009, 2011).
38Although Gill and Stone (2010) call their equilibrium concept a desert equilibrium, it is basically same as CPE.
39As another diﬀerence, we characterize the optimal contracts under PPE as well as under CPE and show the robustness of
team-based incentives, while Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) characterize only under CPE.
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Empirical and experimental research has recently conﬁrmed the importance of expectation-based reference-
dependent preferences. Crawford and Meng (forthcoming) estimate cab drivers’ labor supply decisions based
on the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), and reconcile the ﬁndings between Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein
and Thaler (1997) and Farber (2005, 2008). Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huﬀman (2011) design a real-eﬀort
experiment in which the subjects choose how long they work on a simple repetitive task. They conﬁrm the
validity of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences models; the higher the subjects’ expectations
are, the longer they work and the more they earn. Gill and Prowse (forthcoming) conduct a real-eﬀort
sequential-move tournament experiment, and their result is consistent with the theoretical prediction of
expectation-based reference-dependent preferences with the concept of CPE.40
Finally, as another behavioral approach to study team incentives, some multi-agent moral hazard models
with social preferences have been developed. Englmaier and Wambach (2010), Bartling and Siemens (2010)
and Bartling (forthcoming) study multi-agent moral hazard models when the agents have social preferences.
They show that, even though IPE would be optimal for purely self-interested agents, team incentives can
be optimal. Their optimal team incentives exhibit either a wage scheme that the agent may get the bonus
even if he fails, or a wage scheme that the agent may not get the bonus even if he succeeds. On the other
hand, we predict that the optimal team incentives exhibit the forms of compensation when the agent fails
his task. The prediction is easy to test empirically.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have built a multi-agent moral hazard model in which the agents have expectation-based reference-
dependent preferences. We have used this model to study optimal wage schemes and characterized it using
both CPE and PPE as in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). As a result, we show that when agents’ loss
aversion is not so small, the optimal wage scheme should be based on a kind of performance evaluation
that depends not only on the agent’s own outcome but also on that of his colleagues. Thus, the optimal
wage schemes exhibit team incentives. More speciﬁcally, if the probability of success is less than a half but
not too small, the principal oﬀers a positive wage unless both agents fail, which exhibits joint performance
evaluation; otherwise the principal oﬀers a positive wage unless one agent fails and the other agent succeeds,
40As non real-eﬀort lab experiments, Ericson and Fuster (2010) conduct two stochastic endowment experiments and show
that how subjects’ expectation on keeping (or getting) the endowment aﬀects their actual behavior. Sprenger (2010) conducts
risky choice experiments and argue that how expectation-based reference-dependent preferences can explain his results.
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which exhibits relative performance evaluation.
We predict that the optimal team incentives exhibit the forms of compensation when the agent fails his
task, while the existence literature shows how the agent’s wage should depend on his colleagues’ outcomes
when he succeeds. This prediction makes our results empirically testable. Our result provides a new insight
that team incentives serve as a loss-sharing device among agents, and it may bridge the gap between the
current multi-agent theoretical literature and empirical observation in the workplace.
22
Appendix
A Proofs
Before providing the proofs of lemmas and propositions, we represent agent i’s expected gain-loss utility and
CPE condition in detail.
First, agent i’s expected gain-loss utility on wage is represented as follows:
E[¼i(ai; aj ;wijaˆii; aˆij ; wˆi)] = qˆiai qˆiaj
h
qaifqaj¹(wiHH ¡ wˆiHH) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiHL ¡ wˆiHH)g
+ (1¡ qai)fqaj¹(wiLH ¡ wˆiHH) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiLL ¡ wˆiHH)g
i
+ qˆiai(1¡ qˆiaj )
h
qaifqaj¹(wiHH ¡ wˆiHL) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiHL ¡ wˆiHL)g
+ (1¡ qai)fqaj¹(wiLH ¡ wˆiHL) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiLL ¡ wˆiHL)g
i
+ (1¡ qˆiai)qˆiaj
h
qaifqaj¹(wiHH ¡ wˆiLH) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiHL ¡ wˆiLH)g
+ (1¡ qai)fqaj¹(wiLH ¡ wˆiLH) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiLL ¡ wˆiLH)g
i
+ (1¡ qˆiai)(1¡ qˆiaj )
h
qaifqaj¹(wiHH ¡ wˆiLL) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiHL ¡ wˆiLL)g
+ (1¡ qai)fqaj¹(wiLH ¡ wˆiLL) + (1¡ qaj )¹(wiLL ¡ wˆiLL)g
i
:
Next, using q21¡q20 = (q1¡q0)(q1+q0), q1(1¡q1)¡q0(1¡q0) = (q1¡q0)(1¡q1¡q0) and (1¡q1)2¡(1¡q0)2 =
¡(q1 ¡ q0)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0), (CPE) can be replaced as
q1wHH + (1¡ q1)wHL ¡ q1wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)wLL
+(q1 + q0)(1¡ q1)q1
h
¹(wHL ¡ wHH) + ¹(wHH ¡ wHL)
i
+(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)q21
h
¹(wLH ¡ wHH) + ¹(wHH ¡ wLH)
i
+(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1¡ q1)q1
h
¹(wLL ¡ wHH) + ¹(wHH ¡ wLL)
i
+(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1¡ q1)q1
h
¹(wLH ¡ wHL) + ¹(wHL ¡ wLH)
i
+(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1¡ q1)2
h
¹(wLL ¡ wHL) + ¹(wHL ¡ wLL)
i
¡(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1¡ q1)q1
h
¹(wLL ¡ wLH) + ¹(wLH ¡ wLL)
i
¸ d
∆q
:
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Notice that for any x; y 2 R,
¹m(x¡ y) + ¹m(y ¡ x) = ¡´(¸¡ 1)jx¡ yj:
Then, (CPE) is rewritten again as
q1wHH + (1¡ q1)wHL ¡ q1wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)wLL
¡q1(1¡ q1)(q1 + q0)´(¸¡ 1)jwHH ¡ wHLj ¡ q21(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)jwHH ¡ wLH j
¡q1(1¡ q1)(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)x´(¸¡ 1)jwHH ¡ wLLj ¡ q1(1¡ q1)(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)jwHL ¡ wLH j
¡(1¡ q1)2(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)jwHL ¡ wLLj+ q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)jwLH ¡ wLLj
¸ d
∆q
: (CPE’)
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (i) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that w = (wHH ; wHL; wLH ; wLL) which satisﬁes
minfwLH ; wLLg > 0 is the optimal wage scheme. By Assumption 1, we can reduce the same amount from
each possible wage without violating limited liability constraints. Also, reducing the same amount from all
payments does not aﬀect (CPE’). Thus, the principal can decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
(ii) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose w = (wHH ; wHL; wLH ; wLL) is the optimal wage scheme.
Consider a case in which wHH > wHL. Then, we can take ∆w > 0 such that a new contract w =
(wHH ¡ (1 ¡ q1)∆w; wHL + q1∆w; wLH ; wLL) satisﬁes the limited liability constraints and has the same
ordinal position as the original contract.
First, suppose that wHH > wLH . If wHL ¸ wLH , the diﬀerence between the new contract and the
original one for the left hand side of (CPE’) is
C(w)¡ C(w) = q1(1¡ q1)(q1 + q0)´(¸¡ 1)∆w > 0:
where we denote the L.H.S of (CPE’) as C(w0) when a wage scheme is w0. If wHH > wLH > wHL, the
diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for the left hand side of (CPE’) is
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C(w)¡ C(w) =q1(1¡ q1)(q1 + q0)´(¸¡ 1)∆w + 2q21(1¡ q1)(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)∆w
=q1(1¡ q1)f(1¡ q1)(q1 + q0) + q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)∆w
>0:
Thus, the principal can relax (CPE’) without violating the limited liability constraints. Because an expected
payment under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the principal can decrease the
expected payment. A contradiction.
Second, suppose that wHL < wLH = wHH . By (i) of this Lemma, wLL = 0 holds. The left hand side of
(CPE’) is
C(w) =(1¡ q1)[1¡ f(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)]wHL:
Since we suppose that w satisﬁes (CPE’), 1¡f(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1) > 0 must hold. Then
we can take ∆w > 0 such that a new contract w˜ = (wHH ¡ (1¡ q1)∆w; wHL+∆w; wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)∆w; wLL)
satisﬁes the limited liability constraints and has the same ordinal position as the original contract. The
diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for the left hand side of (CPE’) is
C(w˜)¡ C(w) =(1¡ q1)[1¡ f(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)]∆w > 0:
Thus, the principal can relax (CPE’) without violating the limited liability constraints. Because an expected
payment under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the principal can decrease the
expected payment. A contradiction.
We can prove this in the case where wHH < wHL in the same way except for taking w = (wHH + (1 ¡
q1)∆w; wHL ¡ q1∆w; wLH ; wLL) or w˜ = (wHH + (1 ¡ q1)∆w; wHL ¡ q21∆w; wLH ; wLL ¡ q21∆w) as a new
contract.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First, consider the case of (i) w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0. Suppose that 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) > 0. By
substituting w which holds (CPEJ) with equality into the objective function, this problem is reduced to
min
wLH
·
1¡ q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
¸
wLH
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subject to
wLH 2 [0; w]:
If the coeﬃcient of wLH is positive, wLH should be zero. On the other hand, wLH should be equal to w
if the coeﬃcient of wLH is not positive. As a result, the optimal wLH is presented by
wLH =
(
0 if ΩJ < 1;
w if ΩJ ¸ 1;
where ΩJ ´ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 + q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1).
Next, suppose that 1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) · 0 < 1¡ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1). Since the
coeﬃcient of wLH is positive but that of w is negative. Thus, the solution exists and wLH = w holds at the
optimum.
Finally, suppose that 1¡f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1) · 0. Then the solution does not exist in
this case.
As a result, if ΩJ < 1, the optimal wage scheme is wI = (wI ; wI ; 0; 0) where
wI =
d
∆q[1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)] ;
and the expected wage is
W I = q1
d
∆q[1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)] : (IPE)
If ΩJ > 1 and 1¡f1¡q1¡q0¡q1(2¡q1¡q0)g´(¸¡1) > 0, the solution in this case is wJ = (wJ ; wJ ; wJ ; 0)
where
wJ ´ d
∆q(1¡ q1)[1¡ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] ;
and the expected wage is
W J = q1(2¡ q1) d∆q(1¡ q1)[1¡ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] : (JPE)
If 1¡f1¡ q1¡ q0¡ q1(2¡ q1¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1) · 0, the solution does not exist in this case. This result can
be summarized as follows.
Lemma 3. Suppose that w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0. The solution exists iﬀ 1¡f1¡q1¡q0¡q1(2¡q1¡q0)g´(¸¡1) >
0. If it does exist, the optimal wage scheme is wI = (wI ; wI ; 0; 0) if ΩJ < 1, and wJ = (wJ ; wJ ; wJ ; 0) if
ΩJ ¸ 1.
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Second, we examine the case of (ii) w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0 . The principal’s problem is as follows.
min
w;wLL
q1w + (1¡ q1)2wLL
subject to
f1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)gw
+f¡(1¡ q1) + (1¡ q1)(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) + q1(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)gwLL ¸ d∆q : (CPE2)
w ¸ 0; and wLL 2 [0; w]: (LLR)
where (CPE2) is the condition of CPE and (LLR) is the limited liability conditions in this case, respectively.
(CPE2) is replaced by
Suppose that 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) > 0. By substituting w which holds (CPE2) with equality into
the objective function, this problem is reduced to
min
wLL
·
1¡ q
2
1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
¸
wLL
subject to
wLL 2 [0; w]:
If the coeﬃcient of wLL is positive, wLL should be zero. On the other hand, wLL should be equal w if
the coeﬃcient of wLL is not positive. The optimal wLH is presented by
wLL =
(
0 if ΩR < 1;
w if ΩR ¸ 1;
where ΩR ´ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 + q21(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1).
Next, suppose that 1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) · 0. Since the coeﬃcient of wLL is positive but that of w is
not positive, the solution exists and wLL = w holds at the optimum.
As a result, if ΩR < 1, the optimal contract in this case is wI and the expected wage is WI . On the
other hand, if ΩR ¸ 1, the optimal contract is wR = (wR; wR; 0; wR) where
wR =
d
∆qq1[1¡ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ (1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] ;
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and the expected wage is
WR = (q21 ¡ q1 + 1)
d
∆qq1[1¡ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ (1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] : (RPE)
Since 1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ (1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0) < 0, the solution always exists.
Hence, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose that w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0. The solution always exists. The optimal wage scheme is
wI = (wI ; wI ; 0; 0) if ΩR < 1, and wR = (wR; wR; 0; wR) if ΩR ¸ 1,
where wR = d∆qq1[1¡f1¡q1¡q0¡(1¡q1)(2¡q1¡q0)g´(¸¡1)] .
Now, we derive the optimal wage scheme from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. We have the following relationship:
ΩJ R ΩR , 12 R q1:
When q1 · 12 , we have the following possible cases: (I-1) ΩR · ΩJ < 1, (I-2) ΩR < 1 · ΩJ and (I-3)
1 · ΩR · ΩJ .
First, in case (I-1), the optimal wage scheme is wI which exhibits IPE. Second, in case (I-2), the optimal
wage scheme iswJ which exhibits JPE. These results are easily derived from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Finally,
in case (I-3), we should compare between WJ and WR in order to determine the optimal wage scheme.
WJ < WR , (1¡ 2q1)[1¡ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1(1¡ q1)2(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] > 0: (2)
Since q1 · 12 , we have
WJ ·WR , ΩJR ´ f1¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1(1¡ q1)2(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1) · 1: (3)
Thus, when (I-3), the optimal wage scheme is wJ if (3) is satisﬁed; otherwise wR is the optimal.
Next, when q1 > 12 , we have the following possible cases: (II-1) ΩJ < ΩR < 1, (II-2) ΩJ < 1 · ΩR and
(II-3) 1 · ΩJ < ΩR.
First, by Lemma 3 and 4, the optimal wage scheme is wI in case (II-1) while it is wR in case (II-2). Next,
in case (II-3), we should compare between WJ and WR in order to determine the optimal wage scheme. By
(2) and q1 > 12 , we have
WR < WJ , ΩJR < 1: (4)
Thus, when (II-3), the optimal wage scheme is wR if (4) is satisﬁed; otherwise it is wJ .
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Denote pn ´ NCnqn1 (1¡ q1)N¡n be the probability such that n other agents attain the high outcome
when all agents work. For the notational convenience, denote qHa = qa and q
L
a = (1 ¡ qa) where a 2 f0; 1g.
The principal’s problem is
min
fw(Qi;n)g
NX
n=0
pn[q1w(H;n) + (1¡ q1)w(L; n)]
s:t:
NX
n=0
pn[q1w(H;n) + (1¡ q1)w(L; n)]
¡ 1
2
X
Qi2fH;Lg
X
Qˆi2fH;Lg
NX
n=0
NX
m=0
qQi1 q
Qˆi
1 pnpm´(¸¡ 1) ¢ jw(Qi; n)¡ w(Qˆi;m)j ¡ d
¸
NX
n=0
pn[q0w(H;n) + (1¡ q0)w(L; n)]
¡ 1
2
X
Qi2fH;Lg
X
Qˆi2fH;Lg
NX
n=0
NX
m=0
qQi0 q
Qˆi
0 pnpm´(¸¡ 1) ¢ jw(Qi; n)¡ w(Qˆi;m)j; (5)
w(Qi; n) ¸ 0; 8n w(H;n) ¸ w(L; n); 8Qi 2 fH;Lg 8n 8n0 ¸ n w(Qi; n0) ¸ w(Qi; n):
Note that (5) can be written as
(q1 ¡ q0)
NX
n=0
pn[w(H;n)¡ w(L; n)]
¡1
2
X
Qi2fH;Lg
X
Qˆi2fH;Lg
NX
n=0
NX
m=0
(qQi1 q
Qˆi
1 ¡ qQi0 qQˆi0 )pnpm´(¸¡ 1) ¢ jw(Qi; n)¡ w(Qˆi;m)j ¸ d: (6)
(i) Suppose the following wage scheme such that the agent gets a ﬁxed bonus unless all agents fail their
tasks:
w(Qi; n) =
(
0 if Qi = L and n = 0;
w otherwise:
When w ¸ 0, the wage scheme obviously satisﬁes limited liability constraints. Each agent can get w with
probability 1¡ (1¡ q1)N+1. Hence CPE constraint becomes
(q1 ¡ q0)p0w + [f1¡ (1¡ q0)p0g(1¡ q0)p0 ¡ f1¡ (1¡ q1)p0g(1¡ q1)p0]´(¸¡ 1)w ¸ d
, [1 + f1¡ (2¡ q0 ¡ q1)p0g´(¸¡ 1)](q1 ¡ q0)p0w ¸ d:
Since p0 = (1¡q1)N · 12 by Assumption 2 (iii), the coeﬃcient of w is strictly positive for any parameters.
Therefore, the principal can induce each agent to exert high eﬀort by setting suﬃciently large w > 0.
29
(ii) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that there exists s and t (> s) such that w(H; t) 6= w(H; s)
in the optimal wage scheme w. By Assumption 2 (ii), w(H; t) > w(H; s) holds and we can set t = s + 1
without loss of generality. Also, we can set w(H; s + 1) = w(H;N), otherwise we can take another pair of
wages which contains the highest wage.
Note that for any n · s, w(H; s) ¸ w(L; n) holds because w(H; s) ¸ w(H;n) and w(H;n) ¸ w(L; n). It
implies that if w(L; n) satisfying w(H; s + 1) > w(L; n) > w(H; s) exists, then n > s must hold. Denote l
(¸ s+1) and h ( ¸ l) be the lowest number and the highest number of n that satisﬁes w(H; s+1) > w(L; n) >
w(H; s), respectively. Deﬁne
Ph
n=l pn = 0 if there does not exist n such that w(H; s+1) > w(L; n) > w(H; s).
First, consider a new contract w0 with ∆w > 0 which changes w(H; s) and w(H; s+1) in w to w(H; s)0 =
w(H; s)+ps+1∆w and w(H; s+1)0 = w(H; s+1)¡ps∆w, respectively. All elements of w0 satisfy the limited
liability constraints and has the same ordinal position as the original contract.
Then, the diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for the left hand side of (6) is
(q21 ¡ q20)(ps + ps+1)psps+1´(¸¡ 1)∆w + 2fq1(1¡ q1)¡ q0(1¡ q0)g(
hX
n=l
pn)psps+1´(¸¡ 1)∆w
=f(q1 + q0)(ps + ps+1) + 2(1¡ q1 ¡ q0)(
hX
n=l
pn)g(q1 ¡ q0)psps+1´(¸¡ 1)∆w: (7)
Notice that (7) is strictly positive if either ps + ps+1 ¸
Ph
n=l pn or 1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0 ¸ 0 holds. In these cases,
the principal can relax (6) without violating the limited liability constraints. Because an expected payment
under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the principal can decrease the expected
payment. A contradiction.
Second, suppose that both ps + ps+1 <
Ph
n=l pn and (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0) < 0 hold. Then, we can take
∆w > 0 such that a new contract which changes the wages from the original contract to w0(H; s + 1) =
w(H; s + 1) ¡ (1 ¡ q1)ph∆w and w0(L; h) = w(L; h) + q1ps+1∆w, satisfying the limited liability constraints
and has the same ordinal position as the original contract.
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Then, the diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for the left hand side of (6) is
£
(q21 ¡ q20)(1¡ q1)ps+1(1¡ ps+1)ph + fq1(1¡ q1)¡ q0(1¡ q0)g(1¡ q1)ps+1ph(1¡ ph)
¡ fq1(1¡ q1)¡ q0(1¡ q0)gq1ps+1(1¡ ps+1)ph ¡ f(1¡ q1)2 ¡ (1¡ q0)2gq1ps+1ph(1¡ ph)
+ fq1(1¡ q1)¡ q0(1¡ q0)gps+1phfq1ps+1 + (1¡ q1)phg
¤
´(¸¡ 1)∆w
=
£f(q1 + q0)(1¡ ps+1) + (1¡ q0 ¡ q1)phg(1¡ q1) + f(1¡ q0 ¡ q1)(1¡ q1) + (2¡ q0 ¡ q1)q1g(1¡ ph)
+ q1(1¡ q0 ¡ q1)fps+1 ¡ (1¡ ps+1)g
¤
(q1 ¡ q0)ps+1ph´(¸¡ 1)∆w
=
£f(q1 + q0)(1¡ ps+1) + (1¡ q0 ¡ q1)phg(1¡ q1) + (1¡ q0)(1¡ ph)
¡ q1(1¡ q0 ¡ q1)(1¡ 2ps+1)
¤
(q1 ¡ q0)ps+1ph´(¸¡ 1)∆w: (8)
Notice that 1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0 < 0 implies (q1 + q0)(1 ¡ ps+1) + (1 ¡ q0 ¡ q1)ph > (1 ¡ ps+1) ¡ ph > 0, and
ps+ps+1 <
Ph
n=l pn implies ps+1 <
1
2 . Hence (8) is strictly positive, and the principal can relax (6) without
violating the limited liability constraints. Because an expected payment under the new contract is the same
as under the original contract, the principal can decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
Denote w(H;n) = w where n 2 f0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng. If w = 0, then all wages must be zero because w(H;n) ¸
w(L; n). The contract does not satisfy (6). Therefore, w > 0 in the optimal contract.
(iii) Denote w(H;n) = w > 0 where n 2 f0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng. Also, let bL0 = w(L; 0) and bLn = w(L; n) ¡
w(L; n¡ 1) for n 2 f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng. Note that PNn=0 pnw(L; n) =PNn=0 p˜nbLn where p˜n =PN¡nk=0 pN¡k. Finally,
set bLN = w ¡
PN
n=0 b
L
n .
The principal’s problem can be written as
min
fbLng
q1(bLN +
NX
n=0
bLn) + (1¡ q1)
NX
n=0
p˜nb
L
n
s:t: bLN +
NX
n=0
bLn ¡
NX
n=0
p˜nb
L
n
£¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0) NX
n=0
pn(bLN +
NX
k=n+1
bLn) + (2¡ q1 ¡ q0)
X
n>m
pnpm(
mX
k=n
bLk )
¤
´(¸¡ 1) = d
∆q
; (9)
8n 2 f0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng bLn ¸ 0:
This is a linear programming problem. Notice that (9) is closed. Also, by Assumption 2 (iii), the problem
is implementable. Since each coeﬃcient of bLn in the principal’s objective function is positive and each bLn is
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bounded from below, there exists K 2 R++ such that for any n, bLn > K is never optimal. Thus, without
loss of generality we can restrict the constraint set to bLn · K, which attains boundedness of the constraint
set. Thus, the problem has a solution.
As Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), the solution of a linear programming problem has an extreme
point of the constraint, and generically unique. The unique solution satisﬁes that bLn > 0 holds exactly one
of n 2 f0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng, and bLm = 0 holds for any m 6= n. By the construction of bLn , we have proven that the
optimal wage scheme is binary and uniquely determined in generic.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that at the optimal wage scheme, (CPEM) must hold with equality because otherwise the principal
can decrease w without violating any constraints. Thus, the optimal amount of bonus w¤ is determined by
(CPEM):
w¤ =
d
∆q(1¡ ®)[1 + f1¡ (1¡ ®)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] ;
subject to 1+ f1¡ (1¡®)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1) > 0 () ® > 1¡ 12¡q1¡q0 (1+ 1´(¸¡1) ). Note that (CPEM)
is never satisﬁed when ® · 1¡ 12¡q1¡q0 (1 + 1´(¸¡1) ).
Substituting w¤ into the expected payment function, the principal’s problem becomes:
min
®2[0;1]
W® ´ fq1 + ®(1¡ q1)gd∆q(1¡ ®)[1 + f1¡ (1¡ ®)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)] ; (10)
subject to ® > 1¡ 12¡q1¡q0 (1 + 1´(¸¡1) ).
Since (10) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all ® 2 (1¡ 12¡q1¡q0 (1 + 1´(¸¡1) ); 1), the solution satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition:
dW®
d®
=
d
∆q
1 + f1¡ (2¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1 + q1) + 2®q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0) + ®2(1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)
(1¡ ®)2[1 + f1¡ (1¡ ®)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸¡ 1)]2 ¸ 0; (11)
and holds in equality if ®¤ > 0.
By solving (11), we get the candidate of the optimal compensation rate ®¤ as in the statement. Since
the numerator of (11) is increasing in ®, (11) is also a suﬃcient condition.
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B The Optimal Wage Scheme under PPE
We characterize the optimal wage scheme under PPE. The notion of PPE is the most favorable consistent
action when the agent’s reference point does not change. The consistency of action is deﬁned by UPE. Under
UPE, the agent maximizes his total payoﬀ given that his belief is ﬁxed, and the action must coincide with his
belief. Because there exist multiple UPEs in general, under PPE, we suppose that the agent forms the most
favorable belief from the set of UPEs. The notion of PPE is plausible when the outcome and the payment
occur shortly after the action.
B.1 The Condition of PPE
The condition where (ai; aj ;wjaˆii; aˆij ; wˆ) = (1; 1;wj1; 1; wˆ) is UPE is
U(1; 1;wj1; 1; wˆ) ¸ U(0; 1;wj1; 1; wˆ): (UPE)
This condition is replaced by
q1wHH + (1¡ q1)wHL ¡ q1wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)wLL
+ q21
h
(1¡ q1)¹(wHL ¡ wˆHH)¡ q1¹(wLH ¡ wˆHH)¡ (1¡ q1)¹(wLL ¡ wˆHH)
i
+ q1(1¡ q1)
h
q1¹(wHH ¡ wˆHL)¡ q1¹(wLH ¡ wˆHL)¡ (1¡ q1)¹(wLL ¡ wˆHL)
i
+ (1¡ q1)q1
h
q1¹(wHH ¡ wˆLH) + (1¡ q1)¹(wHL ¡ wˆLH)¡ (1¡ q1)¹(wLL ¡ wˆLH)
i
+ (1¡ q1)(1¡ q1)
h
q1¹(wHH ¡ wˆLL) + (1¡ q1)¹(wHL ¡ wˆLL)¡ q1¹(wLH ¡ wˆLL)
i
¸ (1 + ´)d
∆q
This can be replaced again as
q1wHH + (1¡ q1)wHL ¡ q1wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)wLL + q21(1¡ q1)
h
¹(wHL ¡ wHH) + ¹(wHH ¡ wHL)
i
+q21
h
(1¡ q1)¹(wHH ¡ wLH)¡ q1¹(wLH ¡ wHH)
i
+ q1(1¡ q1)
h
(1¡ q1)¹(wHH ¡ wLL)¡ q1¹(wLL ¡ wHH)
i
+q1(1¡ q1)
h
(1¡ q1)¹(wHL ¡ wLH)¡ q1¹(wLH ¡ wHL)
i
+ (1¡ q1)2
h
(1¡ q1)¹(wHL ¡ wLL)¡ q1¹(wLL ¡ wHL)
i
¡q1(1¡ q1)2x
h
¹(wLL ¡ wLH) + ¹(wLH ¡ wLL)
i
¸ (1 + ´)d
∆q
(UPE’)
By the similar arguments of the characterization in CPE, we ﬁrst have the following lemma.
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Lemma 5. The optimal wage scheme in UPE satisﬁes (i) minfwLH ; wLLg = 0 and (ii) wHH = wHL.
Proof. Notice that, for any w ¸ w0,
(1¡ q1)¹(w ¡ w0)¡ q1¹(w ¡ w0) = f´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)g(w ¡ w0) ¸ 0:
On the other hand, for, w < w0,
(1¡ q1)¹(w ¡ w0)¡ q1¹(w ¡ w0) = fq1´ + (1¡ q1)´¸g(w ¡ w0) < 0:
(i) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose thatw = (wHH ; wHL; wLH ; wLL) which satisﬁes minfwLH ; wLLg >
0 is the optimal wage scheme. By Assumption 1, we can reduce the same amount from each possible wage
without violating limited liability constraints. Also, reducing the same amount from all payments does not
aﬀect (UPE’). Thus, the principal can decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
(ii) We prove it by contradiction. Consider a case of wHH > wHL.
First, suppose that wLH < wHH . Then we can take ∆w > 0 such that a new contract w = (wHH ¡ (1¡
q1)∆w; wHL + q1∆w; wLH ; wLL) satisﬁes limited liability constraints and the same ordinal position with the
original one.
If wHL ¸ wLH , then the diﬀerences of the left hand side of (UPE’) between the new contract and the
original one is
D(w)¡D(w) = q21(1¡ q1)´(¸¡ 1)∆w > 0:
where we denote the left hand side of (UPE’) as D(w0) when a wage scheme is w0.
If wHL < wLH , then the diﬀerences of the left hand side of (UPE’) between the new contract and the
original one is
D(w)¡D(w) =q21(1¡ q1)´(¸¡ 1)∆w ¡ q21(1¡ q1)f´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)g∆w + q21(1¡ q1)fq1´ + (1¡ q1)´¸g∆w
=2q21(1¡ q1)2´(¸¡ 1)∆w > 0:
Thus, the principal can relax (UPE’) without violating limited liability constraints. Since an expected
payment under the new contract is just same as the original contract, the principal can decrease the expected
payment. Contradiction.
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Second, suppose that wHL < wLH = wHH . Then we can take ∆w > 0 such that a new contract
w˜ = (wHH ¡ (1¡ q1)∆w; wHL +∆w; wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)∆w; 0) satisﬁes the limited liability constraints and has
the same ordinal position as the original contract. The diﬀerence between the new contract and the original
one for the left hand side of (UPE’) is
D(w˜)¡D(w) =(1¡ q1)[1 + ´ + q1(2¡ q1)´(¸¡ 1)]∆w > 0:
Thus, the principal can relax (UPE’) without violating the limited liability constraints. Because an expected
payment under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the principal can decrease the
expected payment. A contradiction.
A proof in a case of wHH < wHL is just same as above, except for taking w = (wHH+(1¡q1)∆w; wHL¡
q1∆w; wLH ; wLL) or w˜ = (wHH + (1¡ q1)∆w; wHL ¡ q21∆w; wLH ; wLL ¡ q21∆w) as a new contract.
To explain the intuition, notice that the agent dislikes the wage uncertainty. The principal can encourage
him to work by reducing the wage variation when he succeeds. Also, she can discourage him to shirk by
increasing the wage variation when he fails. Therefore, she sets wHH = wHL and minfwLH ; wLLg = 0 in
the optimal wage scheme.
Now we can rewrite (UPE’) as
w ¡ q1wLH ¡ (1¡ q1)wLL
+q1
h
(1¡ q1)¹(w ¡ wLH)¡ q1¹(wLH ¡ w)
i
+ (1¡ q1)
h
(1¡ q1)¹(w ¡ wLL)¡ q1¹(wLL ¡ w)
i
¡q1(1¡ q1)2
h
¹(wLL ¡ wLH) + ¹(wLH ¡ wLL)
i
¸ (1 + ´)d
∆q
(UPE”)
Given a wage proﬁle, the pair of actions is PPE if it satisﬁes (UPE”) and either (or both) of the following:
U(1; 1;wj0; 1; wˆ) > U(0; 1;wj0; 1; wˆ): (PPE1)
U(1; 1;wj1; 1; wˆ) ¸ U(0; 1;wj0; 1; wˆ); (PPE2)
(PPE1) implies that the agent does not choose to shirk (ai = 0) even when he expected to do so. That is,
(0; 1;wj0; 1; wˆ) is not UPE. If this condition is satisﬁed, the UPE of (1; 1;wj1; 1; wˆ) is PPE because it is a
unique UPE. Intuitively, (PPE1) makes “not working” non-credible: only “working” is a credible plan. Even
if (PPE1) is not satisﬁed and (0; 1;wj0; 1; wˆ) is UPE, (1; 1;wj1; 1; wˆ) is PPE as long as (PPE2) holds. Note
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that (PPE2) is equivalent to (CPE). Thus, if the CPE solution satisﬁes (UPE”), then it is also a solution
to PPE2.
In the following, we replace the strict inequality of (PPE1) with a weak inequality to analyze the optimal
wage scheme. It is justiﬁed by the following limit argument. If we discretize the amount of wage, then the
optimal wage scheme that satisﬁes (PPE1) exists. Suppose we take the limit of the interval which goes to
zero. Then the sequence of the optimal wage scheme converges to the optimal one with continuous wage
space, and it satisﬁes (PPE1) with replacing the strong inequality with the weak inequality.
By the same derivation of Lemma 4 in UPE, it is straightforward to show that the optimal wage scheme
under (PPE1) also satisﬁes minfwLH ; wLLg = 0 and wHH = wHL. Because we can take the same alternative
contracts in the following Lemma 5 as in Lemma 4, the properties of the optimal wage scheme hold even
when both constraints (UPE) and (PPE1) are binding. The same logic also holds when we focus on both
(UPE) and (PPE2).
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6. The optimal wage scheme in PPE satisﬁes (i) wHH = wHL and (ii) minfwLH ; wLLg = 0.
B.2 The Optimal Wage Scheme as PPE
As the optimal wage scheme under CPE, we have the following two possible types of wage schemes due to
Lemma 6: [A] w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0 and [B] w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0.
We can apply the similar way to ﬁnd the optimal wage scheme under PPE as under CPE. We characterize
the optimal wage scheme by studying it in above each case and comparing among them. However, in each
case, we have to ﬁnd the wage scheme which satisﬁes (UPE”) and at least either (PPE1) or (PPE2). Then,
the relationships among (UPE”), (PPE1), and (PPE2) is crucial.
First, we examine case [A] where w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0. If 1¡ (1¡ q1¡ q0)´(¸¡1) > 0, (UPE”), (PPE1),
and (PPE2) are represented as follows:
w ¸ q1
h
1¡ (1¡ q1)
2´(¸¡ 1)
1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)
i
wLH +
d
∆q
¢ 1 + ´
1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1) ; (UPEA)
w ¸ q1
h
1¡ (1¡ q1)(1¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1)
i
wLH +
d
∆q
¢ 1 + ´¸
1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1) ; (PPE1A)
w ¸ q1
h
1¡ (1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
i
wLH +
d
∆q
¢ 1
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) : (PPE2A)
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If 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) < 0, the inequality of (PPE2A) is reversed. If 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) = 0,
the slope of (PPE2A) is zero. We will show that if 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) · 0, (PPE2A) never binds in
equilibrium.
We can describe the ﬁgure where w is the vertical axis and wLH is the horizontal axis. Also, we can
put the lines of (UPEA), (PPE1A), and (PPE2A) on that ﬁgure. It is straightforward to ﬁnd the following
relationships among three lines. First, the slope of (UPEA) is greater than that of (PPE1A). Second, the
slope of (PPE1A) is greater than that of (PPE2A). Third, the y-intersection of (PPE1A) is greater than
that of (UPEA).
We further divide case [A] into some conditions. In what follows, we consider two cases which is classiﬁed
by whether the y-intersection of (PPE1A) is less than that of (PPE2A) or not.
[A-1] The case where the y-intersection of (PPE1A) is less than that of (PPE2A):
This condition is represented by
ΩPPE1 ´ q1 ¡ ´¸(1¡ q1 ¡ q0) < 0: (12)
Notice that 1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0 > 0 is a necessary condition to satisfy the inequality. The condition holds if
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) · 0.
In this case, the optimal wage scheme is always determined at (PPE1A) binding. However, two kinds of
solutions exist; one exhibits IPE and another does JPE. Then the minimization problem becomes
min
w;wLH
q1w + q1(1¡ q1)wLH
subject to
(PPE1A); w ¸ 0; and wLH 2 [0; w]:
By substituting (PPE1A) with equality into the objective function, we ﬁnd the optimal point in this case as
wLH =
(
0 if ΩJA1 < 1
w if ΩJA1 > 1;
(13)
where ΩJA1 ´ ¡´ + fq1(1¡ q1)(1¡ q0)¡ q0g´(¸¡ 1).
Thus, if ΩJA1 < 1, the optimal contract in this case is w
I
A1 = (w
I
A1; w
I
A1; 0; 0) where
wIA1 =
(1 + ´¸)d
∆q[1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1)] :
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The expected wage is
W IA1 = q1
(1 + ´¸)d
∆q[1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1)] : (IPE-PPE1A)
Figure A-1-a describes this situation. The optimal wage scheme is determined at the y-intersection of
(PPE1A).
If ΩJA1 > 1, the optimal wage scheme is w
J
A1 = (w
J
A1; w
J
A1; w
J
A1; 0) where
wJA1 =
(1 + ´¸)d
∆q(1¡ q1)[1 + ´ + (q1 + q0 ¡ q1q0)´(¸¡ 1)] :
The expected wage is
W JA1 = q1(2¡ q1)
(1 + ´¸)d
∆q(1¡ q1)[1 + ´ + (q1 + q0 ¡ q1q0)´(¸¡ 1)] : (JPE-PPE1A)
Figure A-1-b describes this situation. The optimal wage scheme is determined at the intersection between
(PPE1A) and the line of w = wLH . Note that if this intersection is located below (UPEA), then the
intersection between (PPE1A) and (UPEA) may be a candidate of the optimal wage scheme. However, it
does not happen in our model.
Notice that if ´ · 1 and ¸ · 4, then ΩA1J < 1 and thus W IA1 is the optimal.
0
w
wLH
(UPEA)
(PPE1A)
(PPE2A)
w = wLH
Figure A-1-a: the optimal wage scheme wIA1
w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1
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0w
wLH
(UPEA)
(PPE1A)
(PPE2A)
w = wLH
Figure A-1-b: the optimal wage scheme wJA1
w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1
[A-2] The case where the y-intersection of (PPE1A) is equal to or greater than that of (PPE2A) (ΩPPE1 ¸ 0):
We should divide this case into two more cases: [A-2-a] the y-intersection of (PPE2A) is equal to or less than
that of (UPEA) and [A-2-b] the y-intersection of (PPE2A) is greater than that of (UPEA).The condition
for [A-2-a] is represented by
ΩIA2 ´ q1 + (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1 + ´) · 0: (14)
First, in [A-2-a], the optimal wage scheme is determined at the y-intersection of (UPEA) as described by
Figure A-2-a. The optimal wage scheme is wIA2 = (w
I
A2; w
I
A2; 0; 0) where
wIA2 =
(1 + ´)d
∆q[1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)] :
The expected wage is
W IA2 = q1
(1 + ´)d
∆q[1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)] : (IPE-PPE2A)
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0w
wLH
(UPEA)
(PPE1A)
(PPE2A)
w = wLH
Figure A-2-a: the optimal wage scheme wIA2
w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1
Next, in (A-2-b) where ΩIA2 > 0, three kinds of solutions exist. The ﬁrst one is determined at the y-
intersection of (PPE2A) (see Figure A-2-b-i), the second one is is determined at the intersection between
(PPE2A) and the line of w = wLH (see Figure A-2-b-ii), and the last one is is determined at the intersection
between (PPE2A) and (UPEA) (see Figure A-2-b-iii).
The condition which divides the ﬁrst one from others is relevant to the relationship between the slope of
(PPE2A) and that of the line of the principal’s expected payment w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1 where W is the
amount of that payment. If the former is equal to or greater than the latter, the optimal wage scheme is
determined at the y-intersection of (PPE2A). This condition is represented by
q1
£
1¡ (1¡ q1)(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
¤ ¸ ¡(1¡ q1) , ΩJ ¸ 1:
Note that ΩJ ´ fq1(1 ¡ q1)(2 ¡ q1 ¡ q0) + (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)g´(¸ ¡ 1), which is deﬁned in the derivation of the
optimal wage scheme as CPE. As a result, the optimal wage scheme in this case is wI which is the same as
the case of CPE. On the other hand, when ΩJ > 1, the optimal wage scheme must have wLH > 0.
If the intersection between (PPE2A) and the line of w = wLH satisﬁes (UPEA), then w = wLH . This
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condition is represented by
ΩJA2 ´ (1¡ q1)(1¡ q0) + f1¡ 3q1 + q21 ¡ (1¡ q1)q0g´ ¸ 0: (15)
The optimal wage scheme is wJ which we found at the study of CPE. On the other hand, when ΩA2J < 0, the
optimal wage scheme is determined by the intersection between(PPE2A) and (UPEA). The optimal wage
scheme is wJLH = (w
J
A2; w
J
A2; w
J
LH ; 0) where
wJA2 =
[(2¡ q1)f(2¡ q0 ¡ q1)´ + 1¡ q0g ¡ ´]d
(1¡ q1)f(1¡ q1)´ + (1¡ q0)(1 + ´¸)g∆q ;
wJLH =
f1¡ q0 + (1¡ q0 ¡ q1)´gd
q1(1¡ q1)f(1¡ q1)´ + (1¡ q0)(1 + ´¸)g∆q :
Notice that w ¸ wLH if and only if ΩJA2 · 0.
The expected wage is
WLHA2 =
f(1 + q1 + q0(¡1¡ q1 + q21))(1 + ´)¡ q21(3¡ q1)´ ¡ q21gd
(1¡ q1)f(1¡ q1)´ + (1¡ q0)(1 + ´¸)g∆q : (LH-A2)
0
w
wLH
(UPEA)
(PPE1A)
(PPE2A)
w = wLH
Figure A-2-b-i: the optimal wage scheme wI
w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1
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0w
wLH
(UPEA)
(PPE1A)
(PPE2A)
w = wLH
Figure A-2-b-ii: the optimal wage scheme wJ
w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1
0
w
wLH
(UPEA)
(PPE1A)
(PPE2A)
w = wLH
Figure A-2-b-iii: the optimal wage scheme wJLH
w = ¡(1¡ q1)wLH + Wq1
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Now we have the following results in case [A].
Lemma 7. The optimal wage schemes wA in case [A] where w ¸ wLH ¸ wLL = 0 are as follows:
When ΩPPE1 < 0;
(
ΩJA1 < 1 ) wIA1
ΩJA1 > 1 ) wJA1:
(16)
When ΩPPE1 > 0;
8>>><>>>:
ΩIA2 · 0 ) wIA2
ΩIA2 > 0 and
8><>:
ΩJ · 1 ) wI
ΩJ > 1 and
(
ΩJA2 ¸ 0 ) wJ
ΩJA2 < 0 ) wJLH
:
(17)
The optimal wage scheme is derived by the following sequential comparison. First, ΩPPE1 determines
whether the equilibrium payment is based on PPE1 or PPE2. If ΩPPE1 < 0, then the optimal wage scheme
makes the agents “not working” non-credible. The payment scheme is either JPE or IPE based on (PPE1A)
determined by ΩJA1.
However, if ΩPPE1 > 0, then multiple UPEs exist in the optimal wage scheme. If ΩIA2 < 0, then the
solution for (UPEA) satisﬁes (PPE2A). Thus, we need only consider (UPEA), and the optimal wage scheme
is IPE based on (UPEA).
Otherwise, we must verify whether the solution for CPE satisﬁes (UPEA). If ΩJ · 1, the solution for
CPE is IPE based on (PPE2A), and it always satisﬁes (UPEA) provided ΩIA2 > 0.
If ΩJ > 1, the solution of CPE is JPE based on (PPE2A), and it may not satisfy (UPEA). If ΩJA2 ¸ 0,
then it satisﬁes (UPEA) and JPE based on (PPE2A) is the optimal wage scheme. If ΩJA2 < 0, then both
(PPE2A) and (UPEA) bind at the optimum. Hence the optimal wage payment scheme is wJLH .
Second, we see case [B] where w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0. By the similar arguments with case [A], we have
the following results:
Lemma 8. The optimal wage schemes wB in case [B] where w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0 are as follows:
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When ΩPPE1 < 0;
(
ΩRB1 < 1 ) wIA1
ΩRB1 > 1 ) wRB1:
(18)
When ΩPPE1 > 0;
8>>><>>>:
ΩIA2 · 0 ) wIA2
ΩIA2 > 0 and
8><>:
ΩR · 1 ) wI
ΩR > 1 and
(
ΩRB2 ¸ 0 ) wR
ΩRB2 < 0 ) wRLL
:
(19)
Proof. We examine case [B] where w ¸ wLL ¸ wLH = 0. If 1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) > 0, (UPE”), (PPE1),
and (PPE2) are represented as follows:
w ¸ (1¡ q1)
h
1¡ q1(1¡ q1)´(¸¡ 1)
1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)
i
wLL +
d
∆q
¢ 1 + ´
1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1) ; (UPEB)
w ¸ (1¡ q1)
h
1¡ q1(1¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1)
i
wLL +
d
∆q
¢ 1 + ´¸
1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1) ; (PPE1B)
w ¸ (1¡ q1)
h
1¡ q1(2¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1)
i
wLL +
d
∆q
¢ 1
1¡ (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸¡ 1) : (PPE2B)
If 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) < 0, the inequality of (PPE2B) is reversed. If 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) = 0,
the slope of (PPE2B) is zero. We will show that if 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) · 0, (PPE2B) never binds in
equilibrium. In what follows, we omit graphs where w is the vertical axis and wLL is the horizontal axis
because there are essentially same with case [A].
As in case [A], it is straightforward to ﬁnd the following relationships among three lines. First, the slope
of (UPEB) is greater than that of (PPE1B). Second, the slope of (PPE1B) is greater than that of (PPE2B).
Third, the y-intersection of (PPE1B) is greater than that of (UPEB). The process to ﬁnd the optimal wage
scheme in this case is the same as in case [A].
[B-1] The y-intersection of (PPE1B) is less than that of (PPE2B): This condition is the same as case
[A-1] and represented by ΩPPE1 = q1 ¡ ´¸(1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0) < 0. Notice that 1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0 > 0 is a necessary
condition to satisfy the inequality. The condition holds if 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q0)´(¸ ¡ 1) · 0. In this case, the
optimal wage scheme is always determined at (PPE1B) binding and two kinds of solutions exist; one exhibits
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(IPE) and another does (JPE). Then the minimization problem becomes
min
w;wLL
q1w + (1¡ q1)2wLL
subject to
(PPE1B); w ¸ 0; and wLL 2 [0; w]:
By substituting (PPE1B) into the objective function, the optimal wLL in this case is
wLL =
(
0 if ΩRB1 < 1
w if ΩRB1 > 1;
where ΩRB1 ´ ¡´ + fq21(1¡ q0)¡ q0g´(¸¡ 1).
On the one hand, if ΩRB1 < 1, the optimal wage scheme is w
I
A1 which is obtained in case [A]. The expected
wage is also same as that in case [A]:
W IA1 = q1
(1 + ´¸)d
∆q[1 + ´ + q0´(¸¡ 1)] :
On the other hand, if ΩRB1 > 1, the solution in this case is w
R
B1 = (w
R
B1; w
R
B1; 0; w
R
B1) where
wRB1 =
(1 + ´¸)d
∆qq1[1 + ´ + (1¡ q1 + q1q0)´(¸¡ 1)] :
The expected wage is
WRB1 = (q
2
1 ¡ q1 + 1)
(1 + ´¸)d
∆qq1[1 + ´ + (1¡ q1 + q1q0)´(¸¡ 1)] : (RPE-B1)
Notice that if ´ · 1 and ¸ · 3, then ΩRB1 < 1 and thus wIA1 is the optimal.
[B-2] The y-intersection of (PPE1B) is equal to or greater than that of (PPE2B) (ΩPPE1 ¸ 0): We
should divide this case into two more cases; [B-2-a] the y-intersection of (PPE2B) is equal to or less than
that of (UPEB) and [B-2-b] the y-intersection of (PPE2B) is greater than that of (UPEB).As the same in
case [A], the condition for [B-2-a] is represented by ΩIA2 ´ q1 + (1¡ q1 ¡ q0)(1 + ´) · 0.
First, in [B-2-a], the optimal wage scheme is determined at the y-intersection of (UPEB). The optimal
wage scheme is wIA2 = (w
I
A2; w
I
A2; 0; 0) where w
I
A2 =
(1+´)d
∆q [1+´+q1´(¸¡1)] . The expected wage is
W IA2 = q1
(1 + ´)d
∆q[1 + ´ + q1´(¸¡ 1)] : (IPE-PPE-1)
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Next, in (B-2-b) where ΩIA2 > 0, three kinds of solutions exist. The ﬁrst one is determined at the y-
intersection of (PPE2B), the second one is determined at the intersection between (PPE2B) and the line of
w = wLL, and the last one is determined at the intersection between (PPE2B) and (UPEB).
The condition which divides the ﬁrst one and others is relevant to the relationship between the slope
of (PPE2B) and that of the line of the principal’s expected payment, w = ¡ (1¡q1)2q1 wLL + Wq1 , where W is
the amount of that payment. If the former is equal to or greater than the latter, the optimal wage scheme
is determined at the y-intersection of (PPE2B). This condition is represented by ΩR · 1, and the optimal
wage scheme in this case is wI which is the same as the case of CPE. On the other hand, if ΩR > 1, the
optimal wage scheme must have wLL > 0.
If the intersection between (PPE2B) and the line of w = wLL satisﬁes (UPEB), then w = wLL. This
condition is represented by
ΩRB2 ´ q1(1¡ q0)¡ (1¡ 2q1 + q21 + q1q0)´ ¸ 0:
The optimal wage scheme is wR which we found at the study of CPE. On the other hand, if ΩRB2 < 0, the
optimal wage scheme is determined by the intersection between (PPE2B) and (UPEB). The optimal wage
scheme is wRLL = (w
R
B2; w
R
B2; 0; w
R
LL) where
wRB2 =
f(1 + q1)(1¡ q0)(1 + ´)¡ q21´gd
q1f(1¡ q0)(1 + ´¸) + (1¡ q1)´g∆q ;
wRLL =
f1¡ q0 + (1¡ q0 ¡ q1)´gd
(1¡ q1)q1f(1¡ q1)´ + (1¡ q0)(1 + ´¸)g∆q
Notice that ΩRB2 · 0 if and only if w ¸ wLL. The expected wage is
WLLB2 =
f(1 + ´)(1 + 2q21 ¡ (1 + q21)q0)¡ q1(1 + q21)´ + q21gd
q1f(1¡ q1)´ + (1¡ q0)(1 + ´¸)g∆q : (LL-B2)
Denote W x be an expected payment under wx where x 2 fA;Bg. By comparing the optimal wages
under Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, we derive the optimal wage scheme under PPE.
Proposition 3. The optimal wage scheme under PPE is wx which satisﬁes W x = minfWA;WBg.
We provide some graphical illustrations in the following way.
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Figure 3: PPE when ´ = 1, ¸ = 3. The region of each contract scheme which is optimal in PPE is shown
by: IPE=White, RPE=Light Gray.
Figure 3 indicates the optimal wage schemes under PPE when ´ = 1 and ¸ = 3. The middle part of the
white region is IPE based on (PPE2A). When q1 is high and q0 is low, then the optimal wage scheme is
RPE based on (PPE2A). The results regarding the optimal wage schemes under PPE are the same as under
CPE. However, we have two main diﬀerences of the optimal wage schemes between under PPE and under
CPE.
First, if both q1 and q0 are suﬃciently high, then the optimal wage scheme is IPE based on (UPEA). In
that region, the payment under IPE based on (PPE2A) is not enough to induce the agent’s eﬀort. Because
q0 is also high, he has a high probability of receiving a bonus even if he shirks. To ensure that he will work,
the principal has to pay more than under IPE based on (PPE2A). If q1 is small, then a payment that makes
the agent “not working” non-credible is better for the principal than one that satisﬁes (PPE2A). Since the
probability of success is small in such a case, if UPE is not unique then the principal has to pay a lot to
make the agent work. When q1 is small, by making the agent’s “not working” non-credible the expected
payment becomes smaller than the multiple UPE cases. Since JPE based on (PPE2A) becomes an optimal
wage scheme under CPE only if q1 is small, it disappears in this case. However, it becomes optimal in the
region in which q1 is small but not too small, if the degree of loss aversion is greater than the case of Figure
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3. We see the case in the next ﬁgure.
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Figure 4: PPE when ´ = 1, ¸ = 3:5. The region of each contract scheme which is optimal in PPE is shown
by: IPE=White, JPE=Gray, RPE=Light Gray, LL-B2=Mesh.
Figure 4 is the optimal wage schemes as PPE when ´ = 1 and ¸ = 3:5. Now, we have two signiﬁcant
diﬀerences from Figure 3. First, when both q1 and q0 take some middle value, then both (PPE2A) and
(UPEA) bind in the optimal wage scheme. In this case, the principal pays some partial bonus to the agents
if both of them fail. This could be regarded as a kind of promotion tournament.
Second, and more importantly, in the region in which q1 is small but not too small, the optimal wage
scheme is JPE based on (PPE2A). This is because if the degree of loss aversion ¸ is large, the principal has
to pay a high wage to eliminate the “not working” UPE. Because the agents are loss averse with regard to
both wages and eﬀort, as ¸ increases they are less likely to work hard when they expect to shirk. Hence
if ¸ is large and q1 is not too small, using JPE based on (PPE2A) is better for the principal than making
the agent “not working” non-credible. Therefore, if the agents exhibit substantial loss aversion, the optimal
wage schemes are similar to those under CPE except in the regions in which q1 is suﬃciently small or both
q1 and q0 are large.
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